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Abstract
The nature and incidence of earnings management practices have been examined in many re-
search studies, especially in the United States. Research into such practices in Europe, and
specifically in Spain has been less common. This paper makes a contribution to the existing liter-
ature by offering an analysis of certain features of Spanish accounting that can be classified as
earnings management. The population of companies under review comprises those included in
the IBEX-35 index, and so includes the largest companies in Spain. The effects upon earnings of
four commonly encountered features in Spanish accounting practice are examined and quanti-
fied: audit report qualifications, special authorisations to override accounting regulation,
changes in accounting policy and extraordinary items. The results of the analysis show that net
earnings are affected to a significant extent by these items. The paper concludes that these rela-
tively overt forms of earnings management are employed in the financial statements of several
leading Spanish companies. While a reduction in the level of options offered by accounting regu-
lation may help to reduce the incidence of earnings management, it is noted that a tightening of
standards in one area tends to simply shift the location of earnings management. Remedial mea-
sures should, therefore, also include improvements in supervision.
Keywords: Earnings management, financial reporting, Spain, IBEX-35
Introduction
This paper examines the incidence of overt earnings management in larger Spanish listed
companies. The population of companies selected for analysis comprises the IBEX-35 compa-
nies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange. (The IBEX-35 is an index calculated using the share
price variations of the 35 largest Spanish companies). These companies are highly significant
players in the Spanish economy and, in consequence, they can be expected to be subject to quite
detailed scrutiny by the principal groups of users of financial statements. The analysis reported
has been performed on publicly available information contained in the annual reports of the com-
panies under review. There might seem little point in attempting to adjust the earnings of promi-
nent companies by the use of relatively overt methods; the level of scrutiny to which they are nat-
urally exposed should mean that any unusual features would be identified and absorbed by the
market without delay. Nevertheless, this paper will show that several major Spanish companies
do appear to manipulate their reported earnings by quite overt means. The degree to which users
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are successful in identifying earnings management at this level is beyond the scope of the paper
and further research is required.
The paper is structured as follows: first, some of the principal theoretical underpinning relat-
ing to earnings management is discussed. The review of literature is then broadened to examine
definitions of earnings management, motivations for its use, and various empirical studies that
have sought to identify its existence, nature and incidence. Some relevant and interesting features
of the Spanish accounting environment are examined, and then the empirical work is reported.
The paper identifies four principal types of earnings management indicator: audit report qualifi-
cations, special authorisations from regulatory agencies, changes in accounting policy and extra-
ordinary items. The impact of these items on the reported net earnings of several major Spanish
companies is quantified. Following a discussion of the results, the study concludes by identifying
its principal limitations and suggesting further avenues for research.
Theoretical considerations
Agency theory provides the conceptual underpinning for many studies of earnings manage-
ment. The firm operates not as a separate legal personality, but rather constitutes a ‘nexus of con-
tracts’between individuals: ‘The firm is not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a fo-
cus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals are brought into
equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations.’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Within
the agency framework, it is both logical and inescapable that management behaviour will be self-
serving. Agency can, therefore, provide a solid framework for the understanding of earnings
management behaviour. However, it may provide an incomplete theoretical basis for explaining
or predicting management behaviour; the ethical dimension of human behaviour may provide an
important element missing from legalistic and adversarial agency relationships (Horrigan, 1987)4.
The informational perspective (Schipper, 1989) is a key element underpinning the study of
the earnings management phenomenon. A conflict is created by the information asymmetry that
exists in complex corporate structures between a privileged management and a more remote body
of stakeholders. Managers may choose to exploit their privileged position for private gain, by
managing financial reporting disclosures in their own favour. The informational perspective as-
sumes that accounting disclosures have an information content that possesses value to stakehold-
ers in providing useful signals5.
It may be difficult or impossible for individual stakeholders to discern the fact and the effect
of accounting manipulation, because of an insufficient personal skill set, indifference or an un-
willingness to engage in detailed analysis (the mechanistic or naïve investor hypothesis, dis-
cussed by Breton and Taffler, 1995). From a market efficiency perspective such failures in under-
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4. There have been several studies of earnings management issues from an ethical perspective: e.g. Merchant and
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5. However, the credibility and value of that information is frequently questioned. Dipiazza and Eccles (2002) cite
some findings of a recent study by PricewaterhouseCoopers: only 20% of analysts investors and executives consider that
information prepared under current GAAP is useful in presenting a faithful image of companies.
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standing may not matter. Breton and Taffler point out in the conclusion to their study establishing
that analysts’ perception of creative accounting devices is somewhat deficient, only a small num-
ber of effective accounting experts may be required ‘for the market as a whole appropriately to
process window dressed numbers’. On the other hand, Healy and Wahlen (1999) cite studies that
find that earnings management prior to equity issues does affect share prices, suggesting that in-
vestors do not necessarily see through earnings management.
The research reported in this study is positioned within an informational perspective, tem-
pered by the naïve investor hypothesis; it is based upon the propositions, firstly, that financial re-
porting does possess valuable information content, and secondly that distortions in it may not be
readily discernible by all stakeholders or that their effects may not be truly appreciated.
Literature review
There is a substantial literature on earnings management, much of it originating in, and con-
cerned with, the United States. However, the US literature offers valuable insights into earnings
management in any country with a reasonably highly developed capital market (a recent compre-
hensive review of the US literature is provided by Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Also, beyond the US,
there has been a growth in the volume of literature discussing earnings management issues.
Definitions of earnings management
Earnings management is referred to also as: creative accounting, income smoothing, earn-
ings smoothing, financial engineering and cosmetic accounting. The preferred term in the USA,
and consequently in most of the literature on the subject is ‘earnings management’, and so this is
the term that will be used in this paper. However, it should be recognised that some accounting
manipulation involves primarily balance sheet rather than earnings management. Definitions of
earnings management vary, and include the following:
a) ‘Income smoothing [earnings management] is the deliberate dampening of fluctuations
about “some level of earnings considered to be normal for the firm”’. (Barnea et al. 1976)
b) ‘Earnings management is any action on the part of management which affects reported in-
come and which provides no true economic advantage to the organization and may in fact,
in the long-term, be detrimental’. (Merchant and Rockness, 1994)
c) ‘Income smoothing [earnings management] involves the repetitive selection of accounting
measurement or reporting rules in a particular pattern, the effect of which is to report a
stream of income with a smaller variation from trend than would otherwise have ap-
peared’. (Copeland, 1968)
Schipper (1989) observes that ‘earnings management’ can be equated with ‘disclosure man-
agement’, ‘in the sense of a purposeful intervention in the financial reporting process’. This ap-
proach excludes the category of smoothing device that involves delaying or hastening transac-
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tions so that they can be reported in an earlier or later accounting period. Indeed, Copeland (1968)
would also exclude such devices; his definition of a perfect smoothing device includes the point
that it should not involve any real transaction with second parties.
Motivation for earnings management
Various research studies have examined the issue of management motivation towards earn-
ings management behaviour. Half a century ago, Hepworth (1953) identified several motivations
including the existence of tax levies based on income, confidence by shareholders and workers in
management that is able to report stable earnings and psychological expectations relating to in-
creases or decreases in anticipated income. Tax is mentioned as a significant motivator also by
Niskanen and Keloharju (2000) in a Finnish context and in Japan by Herrmann and Inoue (1996).
Beidleman (1973) observes the positive effects of income smoothing on expectations, securities
valuation and some element of risk reduction for analysts. Other motivations for earnings man-
agement discussed by Healy and Wahlen (1999) include those provided when significant capital
market transactions are anticipated, and when there is a gap between the actual performance of
the firm and analysts’ expectations. Healy (1985) examines managers’ earnings manipulations
motives where executive compensation is linked to income measurement. Trueman and Titman
(1988) discuss managers’ motivations to reduce the perception of variability in underlying eco-
nomic earnings of the firm. Kamin and Ronen (1978) observe a difference in motivation between
managers in owner-controlled and management-controlled firms. Owners who wish to retain
control of a sizeable stake and who are therefore not interested in immediate exit strategies are
less likely to be motivated to manage earnings.
Existence of earnings management
Even though managers’ motivation for earning management may be established and ac-
cepted at least in theory, establishing empirically that it takes place is a separate problem. Several
studies have attempted to model earnings management behaviour and to prove its existence
through the analysis of (often very) large datasets (e.g. Barnea et al. 1976; McNichols and
Wilson, 1988; Dascher and Malcom, 1970 and Black et al, 1998)6. An alternative approach is
taken by Naser and Pendlebury (1992) who questioned senior corporate auditors about their ex-
perience of creative accounting. They were able to conclude that a significant proportion of all
categories of company employ creative accounting (earnings management) techniques to some
extent. Merchant (1990) examines management manipulation of accounting information within
two firms (i.e. information used in internal reporting by divisions) drawing upon both interview
and questionnaire data. The research found that ‘managers acknowledged manipulative behav-
iours and short-term orientations’.
Many research studies (some of which are examined in the section immediately below) ex-
amine a particular aspect or technique of earnings management. All tend towards the conclusion
that earnings management using that particular technique does exist.
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Techniques of earnings management
Various techniques of earnings management emerge from the literature. Much of the genuine
management of earnings (as opposed to, say, managing gearing so as to improve proprietary ra-
tios) centres upon the management of accruals of various types. McNichols and Wilson (1988)
model the non-discretionary component of the bad debts provision (so as to identify the discre-
tionary element of the accrual). Barnea et al. (1976) discuss classificatory smoothing with the use
of extraordinary items; their results, based on a study of 62 US companies, indicate that classifi-
catory smoothing does take place. A later large scale study of classificatory smoothing (Dempsey
et al., 1993) found that ‘managers showed a propensity to report extraordinary gains on the in-
come statement and extraordinary losses on the retained earnings statement’. Moreover, this re-
search found that the propensity to report in this way was significantly greater in non-owner man-
aged firms. Dascher and Malcom (1970) analysed data over several years for 52 firms in the
chemical industries sector relating to four income smoothing variables: pensions costs, dividends
from unconsolidated subsidiaries, extraordinary charges and credits and research and develop-
ment costs. They concluded that their results were consistent with the hypothesis that deliberate
smoothing had taken place. Large provisions against uncertain levels of future loss are highly de-
pendent upon the judgements made by management. Healy and Wahlen (1999) cite several stud-
ies that find ‘compelling evidence’ of income smoothing via accruals in banks and insurers, for
example, Beatty et al. (1995).
Black et al. (1998) examine non-current asset sales as earnings management tools, using a
very large dataset of observations from Australia, New Zealand and the UK. They find that, where
the relevant accounting standards are permissive (as in the UK up till 1993) managers will exploit
the potential for earnings management via timing of asset sales. Such behaviours are curtailed
once the provisions of accounting standards are tightened. However, amongst their conclusions,
they observe that ‘there is every reason to believe that firms can “shift” earnings management ac-
tivity among a variety of methods’. So, even if certain loopholes in regulation are eliminated,
earnings management behaviour is likely to persist.
Balance sheet (as opposed to earnings) management is relatively under-explored in the litera-
ture. However, the study by Gramlich et al. (2001) suggests that firms engage in balance sheet
manipulation to reclassify liabilities in order to smooth reported liquidity and leverage ratios.
A special type of earnings management relates to the presentation of financial numbers,
based on cognitive reference points. As explained by Niskanen and Keloharju (2000): ‘the idea
behind this behaviour is that humans may perceive a profit of, say, 301 million as abnormally
larger than a profit of 298 million’. Their study and others (e.g. van Caneghem, 2002) have indi-
cated that some minor massaging of figures does take place in order to reach significant reference
points.
The potential for earnings management
The potential for earnings management is found in three principal areas: regulatory flexibil-
ity, a dearth of regulation and scope for managerial judgement in respect of assumptions about the
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future. Even in a highly regulated accounting environment such as the USA, a great deal of flexi-
bility is available (Largay, 2002; Mulford and Comiskey, 2002). Taking each of the three areas in
turn:
1. Regulatory flexibility. Accounting regulation often permits a choice of policy, for exam-
ple, in respect of asset valuation (in international practice, for example, IAS 16 permits a
choice between carrying non-current assets at either revalued amounts or depreciated his-
torical cost). Business entities may, quite validly, change their accounting policies. As
Schipper (1989) points out, such changes may be relatively easy to identify in the year of
change, but are much less readily discernible thereafter.
2. Dearth of regulation. Some areas are simply not fully regulated7. For example, there are
(as yet) very few mandatory requirements in respect of accounting for stock options. In
Spain, accounting regulation in some areas is limited: for example the recognition and
measurement of pension liabilities and certain aspects of accounting for financial instru-
ments.
3. Management has considerable scope for estimation in discretionary areas. McNichols and
Wilson (1988), for example, examine the discretionary and non-discretionary elements of
the bad debts provision.
Earnings management research outside the US
As noted above, the majority of research studies are based on US evidence and are under-
taken by US authors. However, there has been some interest in earnings management elsewhere,
especially perhaps in the UK. Following a series of accounting scandals during the 1980s interest
in the topic burgeoned and several texts were published: Griffiths (1986 and 1995); Smith (1992);
Naser (1993) and McBarnet and Whelan (1999). Specific studies that analyse earnings manage-
ment practices outside the US include: Black et al. (1998) – Australia, New Zealand and the UK;
Niskanen and Keloharju (2000) – Finland; and Jones et al. (2001) – Australia.
Eilifsen et al. (1999) model income disclosure options within the context of a close link be-
tween taxable profits and accounting profits, observing that linked accounting and tax income
‘provides, in a weak sense, at least’, an automatic safeguard against unwanted earnings manipula-
tion of financial statements’. Although this study is not country-specific, it clearly has relevance
to the countries of continental Europe where a close link between tax and accounting income has
been the norm. In recent years, however, the link has tended to weaken throughout Europe, thus
opening the possibility that the incidence of earnings management behaviour will increase. It
should also be noted in this context that the deterrent (even if ‘weak’) offered by the tax-account-
ing link, would not apply to accounting statements (such as consolidated financial statements)
that do not form the basis of actual taxation charges.
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haviour if the earnings management potential latent in certain accounting standards is eliminated through a tightening of
the rules.
SCE ANUARI VOL-18  17/5/04  12:41  Página 98
There has been relatively little research on earnings management in Spain (but see Giner,
1992), although awareness of the topic was raised by the publication of a book on creative ac-
counting in 1996 (Amat and Blake, 1996).
The Spanish accounting environment
Substantial differences continue to exist between the accounting regulatory regimes of differ-
ent countries, despite the move towards international harmonisation (Street et al. 2000).
Differences tend to persist in areas such as asset valuation, revenue and expense recognition and
measurement, depreciation and amortisation, recognition of provisions and liabilities, accounting
for stock options, foreign currency, derivatives and discounting. The reconciliation to US GAAP
of those Spanish companies that are listed in both Madrid and New York is illustrative of the de-
gree of difference. Table 1 shows 2001 data for all seven companies in this category. In all cases,
earnings under US GAAP are lower than under Spanish accounting regulation.8
Within Spanish GAAP, as elsewhere, there is a great deal of scope for variation within re-
ported results (Lainez et al., 1999)9. For example in valuing inventories, Spanish accounting regu-
lation currently permits the adoption of average cost, FIFO or LIFO. The differences in reporting
profits can be substantial depending upon which policy is selected by management.
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Table 1: Net income of seven Spanish companies under Spanish and US GAAP 
(all figures in million euros)
Year: 2001
Net income: Net income:
Company Spanish GAAP US GAAP Difference
BBVA +2,363 +680 +1,683
Endesa +1,479 +1,034 +445
SCH +2,486 +2,176 +310
Repsol +1,025 +980 +45
Telefónica +2,106 –7,182 +9,288
Telefónica Móviles +893 +320 +573
Terra –566 –11,411 +10,845
Total +9,786 –13,403 +23,189
8. The very large differences are caused in many cases in 2001 by the accounting rules relating to accounting for
goodwill. US rules require that goodwill should be assessed for impairment; in 2001, with a stock market in freefall, im-
pairment losses were substantial. In Spain, by contrast, goodwill is written off on the straight line basis usually over a pe-
riod of 20 years.
9. One of the authors of this paper has estimated the effects, in 2000, on a particular Spanish company of applying
the most and least conservative policies available. Taking a base of 100 to represent the most commonly applied account-
ing policies in Spain, application of the most conservative policies results in a comparative index number of -31.
Application of the least conservative policies available results in a comparative index number of +140.
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However, there are some unusual features of the Spanish accounting environment that merit
special attention. First, audit report qualifications are common, even in respect of major listed
companies. Acerete Gil et al, 2002, find that between in the years 1996-2000 the number of quali-
fied audit opinions in the financial statements of listed Spanish companies fell but the number
was still high in 2000 when 92 companies had audit qualifications. The Comisión Nacional del
Mercado de Valores (the Spanish equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
– CNMV) reports that in 2002 109 listed companies have filed financial statements containing a
qualified audit report (this figure represents 16.1% of the total number – 676 – of listed company
filings). The number of audit report qualifications had, in fact, increased by 15.9% over the com-
parable figure in 2001.
Second, a feature which is likely to elicit some surprise outside Spain, an element of earnings
management may be carried out with the collusion of the regulatory authorities. Supervising
agencies10 may permit individual companies to adopt an accounting policy which contravenes
current accounting regulation. Such authorisations are provided as a result of effective lobbying
by either a company or representative companies within an industrial sector. Successful lobbying
of this type demonstrates the power of influence that the business sector may have over govern-
ment or its agencies. For example, the Spanish Central Bank has occasionally authorised a bank
experiencing commercial difficulties, to disapply GAAP relating to provisions for bad debts.
Also, during times of currency devaluation, the Spanish accounting regulatory body (ICAC) au-
thorised certain companies (for example, utilities) to derecognise exchange losses. The practice
of charging expenses to reserves rather than to the income statement may also be permitted.
Several leading Spanish authorities have recently expressed their view that major accounting
scandals, of the type that have occurred in the last two or three years in the USA, are unlikely to oc-
cur in Spain. However, this view can be challenged. Jimenez and Abril (2002) have identified sev-
eral instances of Spanish listed companies with significant accounting problems. For example:
a) Failing to account fully for the consequences of serious risks, especially those arising
from exposure in Latin America (e.g. Teléfonica, Teléfonica Móviles, Repsol, Aguas de
Barcelona and Aurea).
b) Charging expenses to reserves (BBVA and BSCH)
c) Overstatement of net income (Sol Meliá and Campofrio)
d) Classification of extraordinary profits as income arising from ordinary activities (Unión
Fenosa)
e) Failure to provide full information resulting in a limitation of audit scope (Pescanova,
EADS, Avanzit, Funespaña and Urbas).
100
10. These include: the Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas (Spanish Institute of Accounting and
Auditing – ICAC), the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (the Spanish equivalent of the Securities and Exchange
Commission – CNMV) and the Spanish Central Bank.
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Regulatory agencies responsible for policing the implementation of accounting regulation
are often accused in Spain of deliberately ignoring obvious cases of rule infringement (for exam-
ple, see Pérez, 2002).
Research objective
The objective of this research is to identify earnings management practices in large Spanish
listed companies and to quantify, as far as possible, the effects of such practices using the compa-
nies’ financial statements as sources of data. It should be noted that, therefore, any earnings man-
agement behaviour identified in the study is relatively overt, and almost certainly legal. The scope
of the study therefore excludes all those categories of earnings management behaviour that are
hidden and cannot be discerned by an informed and skilled observer undertaking a close exami-
nation of the financial statements.
Research method
The following occurrences have been classified for the purposes of this study as possible in-
dicators of earnings management:
a) Auditor report qualifications (in Spain there is no requirement to restate the financial
statements to reflect the effect of the qualifications. The effect is, however, noted in the
audit report).
b) Special authorisations from regulatory agencies to adopt non-standard policy
c) Changes in accounting policy from one year to another (in Spain, such changes have to be
explained and the consequences quantified in the auditor’s report).
d) Existence of extraordinary results and prior period adjustments in the income statement
Generally, empirical research on the extent and incidence of earnings management relies
upon statistical analysis of, for example, discretionary accruals over a very large dataset
(Schipper, 1989). However, the incidence of special accounting features particular to the Spanish
accounting environment allows for targeted analysis of individual companies.
The sample of companies comprises the 35 companies included in the Madrid Stock
Exchange’s IBEX-35 index. These are the largest companies in Spain and are likely to account
for a significant proportion of the total movement of funds in and out of the Spanish capital mar-
ket. The annual reports of the 35 companies were thoroughly scrutinised over a three year period
from 1999 to 2001 in order to identify instances of the four possible indicators of earnings man-
agement. The incidence and impact of special authorisations, audit report qualifications and ex-
traordinary items are easy to identify in an annual report. Analysis of any changes in accounting
policy are also easy to identify (from information included in the audit report) but require careful
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consideration as to whether or not they are likely to constitute earnings management behaviour.
Audit report information was considered in conjunction with detailed analysis of the notes to the
financial statements in determining whether or not the changes in policy could be categorised as
earnings management behaviour.
Accounting policies were compared both with those policies adopted in previous years, and
with those adopted by competitors in order to assess whether or not an individual company’s poli-
cies were out of line with those generally adopted in the rest of the sector.
Results
The analysis of the results is presented in three sections. First, we consider the effects of the
four categories indicating possible earnings management behaviour upon consolidated earnings
levels. Then, we examine the effect at the individual accounts level (the financial statements of
the holding companies). In both cases, the analysis is of the 2001 financial statements. Finally, we
examine the effects on reported earnings at the individual company level, of audit report qualifi-
cations, special authorisations and changes in accounting policy in three consecutive years from
1999-2001.
The analysis covers the reported earnings at both the consolidated and individual financial
statement level because both sets of financial statements are published in Spain. Users could be
influenced by either or both sets, and so it would be potentially misleading to examine only one or
the other.
The analysis separates the effects of, on the one hand, audit report qualifications, special au-
thorisations and changes in accounting policy, and, on the other hand, extraordinary items. This is
because the first three categories point much more clearly towards earnings management behav-
iour. The existence of extraordinary items, however, is more ambiguous; they may indicate an at-
tempt at classificatory smoothing, but may be quite genuinely extraordinary (within the definition
offered by Spanish accounting regulation). It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the na-
ture of the extraordinary items but their effect on net earnings is reported here as being worthy of
note for two principal reasons:
• The sheer incidence of extraordinary items in the financial statements reviewed.
• The preponderance of extraordinary expenses compared to extraordinary income.
Table 2 shows the effects of all four categories of potential earnings management behaviour
on the consolidated financial statements of the IBEX-35 companies. The upper part of the table
identifies the effects of audit report qualifications, special authorisations and changes in account-
ing policy. The financial statements of twelve of the 35 groups of companies (over one-third) con-
tained at least one instance of these effects, and in two cases (BBVA and BSCH —both banks—
there were two instances). The lower part of the table demonstrates the level and effect of extraor-
dinary income and expenses on the reporting earnings.
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Three of the twelve named groups of companies had been granted special authorisations (all
are banking institutions). Six out of the twelve had qualified audit reports; the nature of the quali-
fication is briefly summarised in the table. Five of the groups of companies reported changes in
accounting policy that can be construed as potential earnings management behaviour.
Taking these three categories of item into account, consolidated net earnings of the twelve
named groups are reduced by 22%. The impact on the aggregated consolidated earnings of the
IBEX-35 for 2001 is a reduction of 10%.
Table 3 shows the effects on earnings reported in individual (holding company) financial state-
ments. Two companies experienced auditor qualifications, three had special authorisations and five
had changes in accounting policy suggestive of earnings management. The reasons for the specific
audit report qualifications and the nature of the accounting policy changes are specified within the
table. Adjusted earnings for the nine companies are some 22% lower than reported earnings once
the effects of these adjustments are taken into account. The effect of extraordinary items is striking;
at the individual company level extraordinary expenses are far higher than extraordinary income.
Finally, the impact of earnings management on reported earnings (at the individual company
level only) was assessed for each of the three financial years in the 1999-2001 period. The aggre-
gate impact on earnings of three categories (audit report qualifications, special authorisations and
changes in accounting policy) was assessed and an adjusted net earnings figure was calculated.
(Note that, for this purpose, and for the reasons explained earlier, extraordinary items were ex-
cluded from the analysis). The difference between reported and adjusted net earnings is ex-
pressed as a percentage for each of the companies concerned in Table 4.
It may be noted that in 1999, a year when the economy was in a relatively buoyant condition,
the reported earnings of 9 firms were less than adjusted earnings. However, in 2000 and 2001
when the Spanish economy was affected by an economic downturn, the position is reversed. A
clear majority of the companies under scrutiny in both years showed reported earnings higher
than adjusted earnings.
Discussion
All of the earnings management behaviours identified in this study have been identified through
careful analysis of the financial statements. Some of the manifestations are easier to identify than
others, but all should be observable by a reasonably well-informed user of the financial statements.
The question may be asked if the earnings management behaviour is so obvious, can it properly
be classified as earnings management at all? However, the extent to which users of the statements
actually do observe such relatively clear examples of earnings management is uncertain11. It has
104
11. It is interesting in this context to note that, when an earlier version of this paper was reported in the press in
Spain, some of the named companies responded very indignantly to their identification as managers of earnings. This
may, of course, be a natural reaction common with any type of adverse publicity, but it could also indicate that company
managers do not wish to have the nature and extent of earnings management made public, and suggests the possibility that
they may regard it as information that has hitherto been hidden.
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been observed that analysts’ reports in Spain usually fail to mention the existence of audit report
qualifications, special authorisations or other manifestations of earnings management practices, and
that analysts have very short memories where such matters are concerned (Expansión Directo,
2002). Even quite clear signalling can be misinterpreted or ignored even by relatively sophisticated
users (Beton and Taffler, 1995). Furthermore, Dechow and Skinner (2000) argue that even if finan-
cial statements provide sufficient information to permit users to adjust for earnings management,
there would still be cause for concern over the value of the information content because of ‘the pos-
sibility that certain investors rely completely on earnings numbers reported on the face of the in-
come statement because their ability to process more sophisticated (i.e. footnote) information is
limited’.
The results of the research show that some element of overt earnings management practice is
common in large Spanish companies. The unusually high incidence of audit report qualifications
identified by Acerete Gil et al. (2002) and the CNMV suggests that corporate management com-
monly takes the decision to overstate or understate net earnings even at the expense of a report
qualification. In some cases, this may be because managers genuinely feel that their own presen-
106
Table 4: Differences (%) between reported and adjusted net earnings in the
IBEX-35 between 1999 and 2001
(using individual company financial statements)
Company 1999 2000 2001
Acciona –92%
Acerinox +3% +1%
Alba +5% +2%
Acesa –3% –3%
BBVA –14% –58% –36%
BSCH –74% –44% –28%
Bankinter +2%
Carrefour +11% +7% +6%
Dragados +13% –10% +9%
Endesa +2% –219%
Gamesa –952% –153%
Gas Natural –1%
Iberdrola –21% –74%
Indra +3% +9%
Popular –13%
Prisa +14%
Red Eléctrica –2% –3% –4%
Sol Meliá –73%
Telepizza –252%
Telefónica +10%
Unión Fenosa +37% –15%
Number of companies 14 16 9
Reported earnings > adjusted 5 11 7
Reported earnings < adjusted 9 s5 2
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tation provides a fairer view. However, it appears in practice that many audit report qualifications
relate simply to disagreement over the adequacy of discretionary accruals elements.
The results of the study over a three year time period suggest that the direction of earnings
management could be related to general economic conditions. (This possibility was flagged by
Merchant (1990)).
In 2005, Spanish listed companies, in common with all others in the European Union, will be
obliged to report under international accounting standards. A decision has been taken in Spain to
extend this reporting requirement to all unlisted companies by 2007; therefore, de facto, Spanish
accounting regulation will cease to exist within a very short period of years. However, it appears
that Spanish corporate managers are accustomed to (often) large-scale accounting manipulation,
and the change of regulatory regime may not necessarily alter behaviour. As demonstrated in this
study regulatory agencies were quite prepared to offer dispensations from compliance to effective
lobbyists in 2001; it may be reasonable to suppose that lobbying in the Spanish environment will
continue to produce successful outcomes for the lobbyists.
Conclusions, limitations and suggestions for further research
This paper has quantified the extent of certain types of earnings management upon the largest
Spanish companies. The availability and potential impact of special authorisations to avoid cer-
tain regulatory provisions is likely to be of particular interest to a non-Spanish readership.
However, the high incidence of audit report qualifications is also a feature of interest, as is the na-
ture of the accounting policy changes practised in the period under review. It can be concluded
that relatively overt forms of earnings management do take place amongst several leading
Spanish listed companies. Companies take advantage of the range of accounting policy options
permissible within the regulations to manipulate their reported earnings. The nature and extent of
this phenomenon should be of interest to the Spanish regulatory authorities.
From a policy perspective, it would appear to make sense to reduce the number of options
available in Spanish accounting. This would be in line with the approach adopted by the
International Accounting Standards Board, and would better prepare Spanish companies for the
changeover to international standards that will take place in the next few years. However, tighten-
ing the rules is not, on its own, sufficient. As observed earlier in the paper, improving standards in
one area simply tends to shift the location of earnings management. In Spain, remedial measures
must also include improvements in accounting supervision. On a sub-regulatory level, analysts
could be encouraged to include more information in their reports on overt earnings management
practices.
The study reported in this paper has some clear limitations. One of its principal limitations is
that the analysis has been limited to only those earnings management practices that can be identi-
fied easily from published financial statements. From an agency theoretical perspective, it might
be expected that managers would attempt, as far as possible, to conceal such practice; the condi-
tion of information asymmetry means that they are well placed to do so. Agency theory suggests
107
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that we might expect, with a reasonable degree of confidence, that deliberately concealed earn-
ings management also takes place.
A further limitation should be recognised in respect of the sample of companies chosen for
examination. While the IBEX-35 companies are certainly highly significant to the Spanish econ-
omy, they may not be representative of it. On the one hand, they are more profoundly affected by
developments and improvements in corporate governance, but on the other hand, they are under
greater pressure from analysts than smaller companies to report within certain parameters.
The study suggests opportunities for further research. First, within the limitations estab-
lished in the paper, it would be possible to extend the analysis further to cover both a longer
time period and a larger number of companies. Further research of the type pioneered in the
USA by, for example, McNichols and Wilson (1988) applying discretionary accruals models to
large financial data sets in order to identify the extent of covert earnings management, could be
undertaken in Spain. It is clear from the evidence presented in the paper that extraordinary
items are frequently encountered features in Spanish published financial statements. This pa-
per has not, however, attempted detailed analysis of such items, and it is likely to be a fruitful
area for future research. Finally, the impact upon Spanish analysts and other key users of the
relatively overt earnings management behaviour discussed in this paper is under-explored.
Further research is needed to identify the extent to which users of Spanish listed companies’ fi-
nancial statements are capable, in practice, of identifying the earnings management features
discussed in this paper.
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